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Manning was arrested soon after her chat "friend" Adrian Lamo 
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Manning was in contact with Julian Assange and was considering turning over the evidence of war crimes and other select files to WikiLeaks.
5
Manning's subsequent detention and court-martial 6 have been watched and criticized for many reasons. This Note will concentrate on one specific aspect of the case: the earliest defense strategy of eliciting Manning's gender identity, including the use of the diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) and negative stereotypes associated with it, as a factor mitigating Manning's culpability. 7 It will examine disparities between what is good for social justice movements versus what is good for individual people accused of crimes, applying criminal defense ethical theories and comparing Manning's case to criminal cases in which negative stereotypes about marginalized groups have been used to benefit individual persons accused of crimes. While the issues raised by Manning's defense are applicable in the context of the criminal system, Manning is not being tried within that system, nor is her case indicative of trends within it. , available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/ RS21850.pdf. 7 The tactic is controversial and objectionable on many levels that I will discuss in this Note, which in turn is my attempt-as a white, queer, cisgender (person who is not transgender and whose gender identity conforms generically to the biological sex assigned at birth) activist, trans ally, and aspiring criminal defense attorney-to grapple with the tensions between criminal defense lawyering and social justice movements. 8 As a low-income, white, apparently gender-conforming gay person in the Army, Manning is not entirely representative of those whom the criminal system systematically seeks out and punishes. It is important to note that there is a crisis of mass incarceration in the U.S., and this crisis drives many criminal defense attorneys in the work they do, including the author. Gender Identity Disorder (GID), discussed in greater detail in Section II, was an extremely controversial diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM); 9 community action and criticism led the American Psychiatric Association (APA) to announce in December 2012 that it would remove GID from the most recent revised edition, DSM-5, which was published in May 2013. 10 GID's very existence is considered by some to be an affront to transgender, 11 genderqueer, and gender non-conforming people because it normalizes the gender binary by pathologizing people who don't fit the narrow idea of the DSM authors (and others) about what a "man" or "woman" is. However, the GID diagnosis in the U.S. has been necessary for trans people to receive certain essential gender-affirming medical care, or have it paid for by insurance. This creates something of a "necessary evil" relationship between the GID diagnosis and trans people who need medical services.
This Note is written from a perspective that does not accept either that trans identity/gender-nonconformity is a pathology or that the criminal system is a place of justice. Through this lens, it will analyze Manning's defense attorney's early choice to exploit the GID diagnosis, in the face of a movement that challenges its 9 DSM, Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (explaining that the DSM was created by the American Psychiatric Association, which considers it to be the "standard classification of mental disorders") (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); DSM: History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, http://www.psychiatry.org/ practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (explaining that the first edition was published in 1952 and it has been revised several times since then). 10 Zack Ford, APA Revises Manual: Being Transgender Is No Longer a Mental Disorder, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/12/03/1271 431/apa-revises-manual-being-transgender-is-no-longer-a-mental-disorder/. 11 The terms "transgender," "trans," "genderqueer," and "gender-nonconforming" are used throughout this Note as umbrella terms to refer to people who "transcend gendered social roles assigned at birth based on their anatomical sex." See Transgender 101: A Quick Guide on Being an Ally to People Who Are Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming, TRANSGENDER LAW PROJECT OF ILL., http://tjlp.org/TRANSGENDER101 QuickGuide.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). These terms are meant to be used analogously to the term "trans*" and to be inclusive of non-cisgender identities, rather than referring to an exclusive form of gender identity or presentation. and criminal justice theories and practice-at the center of which sits Chelsea Manning.
Part I of this Note is an overview of Manning's case and Part II is a brief introduction to concepts of gender identity and trans activism. Part III reviews the theories of punishment, concepts of culpability, the complex role of the criminal defense attorney, and the use of narrative storytelling in defense practice. Part IV analyzes other defenses used to either mitigate culpability or reduce sentences based on characteristics of the accused, from mental health to race to gender to cultural background. Part V focuses on past use of gender and sexuality in criminal courts. The Note concludes with the author's opinion that the wisdom of the defense strategy in Manning's case was questionable, although its use was arguably ethical if Manning agreed to it.
I. THE UNITED STATES V. PFC. MANNING 13 Chelsea Manning was accused of leaking over 500,000 military 12 The term queer has been reclaimed as a positive word that embraces nonconformance with gender and sexuality norms and celebrates a culture outside the mainstream. It will be used in this way to describe individuals and communities throughout the paper. 13 The military judge in Manning's court-martial, Colonel Denise Lind, refused to turn over transcripts, court orders, or prosecution documents filed during pre-trial hearings for nearly three years. The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), of counsel in the U.S. to Julian Assange, filed briefs with the military trial court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces on behalf of itself and several independent journalists and media organizations, demanding public access to all pretrial filings, conferences, rulings, and orders. press-releases/dod-release-of-docs-manning-case-falls-short-of-legalrequirement. Importantly, media were not allowed to enter the court pressroom on several occasions (including hearings attended by the author in July 2012), and the public therefore has had to rely on reports by journalists who were forced to sit in the audience and take notes by hand, without computers. the most serious being "Aiding the Enemy," 20 a charge which reeks of treason and carries a sentence of death, although the government prosecutors have said they will "only" seek life imprisonment, not death. 21 On February 28, 2013, Manning offered a guilty plea to ten lesser included offenses that carried a maximum total sentence of twenty years behind bars.
22
The government continued to prosecute Man- The hearing differs most significantly from a state or federal criminal court grand jury indictment in that the person accused has access to the proceeding and may see the evidence against her, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments, and is thus an opportunity for the defense to both glean discovery and to present testimony and evidence. 26 In this case, the hearing provided the first glimpse of Manning's defense strategy.
Coombs focused heavily on Manning's sexual orientation and gender identity, coupled with narratives about her mental and emotional health, as factors mitigating her culpability. 27 The goal of guilty, PFC Manning has accepted responsibility for his actions of releasing information to Wikileaks. PFC Manning did not plead guilty pursuant to a 'plea bargain' or 'plea deal' with the Government."). 23 and also to support a diminished capacity defense by showing Manning did not have the intent to aid the "enemy," which the 10 U.S.C. § 904 statute requires. At the hearing, Coombs questioned Army investigators about whether they were aware of Manning's cyber "alter ego" (Breanna Manning), or that Manning had sent an email to her supervisor SFC Paul Adkins in April 2010 stating that she suffered from GID, including a photograph of herself in traditionally feminine clothing. 29 One investigator who searched Manning's home after the arrest testified, upon questioning by Coombs, that she discovered a pamphlet about facial feminization and gender reassignment surgeries and a study entitled "Transsexuals in the Military: Flight into Hypermasculinity."
30
When the prosecutor challenged the relevance of this line of questioning, Coombs replied that the questions "were relevant to whether Pfc. Manning had diminished capacity at the time of the alleged offenses," and therefore lacked the intent necessary to establish the charges.
31
Coombs also questioned witnesses about Manning's emotional health while in the service. In December 2009, after being deployed, Manning flipped over a table and broke a computer; she was restrained by a fellow soldier based on a fear that she would use a weapon that was in the room. 35 After this event, Showman informed Adkins that she felt Manning's security clearance should be revoked, and Adkins did not take action.
36
In May 2010, Showman saw Manning in the fetal position after a therapy session; a few hours later, Manning allegedly hit her after Showman confronted her, and Showman then pinned Manning to the ground. This statement was assumed to relate either to Manning's sexuality or gender identity.
39
During closing arguments, Coombs declared that GID "is an unfortunate term. It is not a disorder. When a person looks in the mirror and they do not feel that the person they are looking at is the gender they are, that's not a disorder. That's reality." 40 He then read Manning's letter to her supervisor, Adkins (who refused to testify, invoking the right against self-incrimination), which described Manning's struggles with gender identity, her initial wish that the military would help her, and the subsequent realization that she could not get help from family or supervisors while in the military. 41 Coombs emphasized that Manning was not adequately supported by her supervisors, who did next to nothing to help Manning after learning of her emotional distress. 42 Coombs then recounted other incidents which he claimed indicated that Manning was not emotionally stable, including carving "I want" into a chair with a knife. 43 The prosecution, by contrast, did not mention Manning's emotional or behavioral concerns at all in its closing; it focused solely on the classified information that was leaked and how it intended to prove that Manning was the one who leaked it. 44 One month after the Article 32 hearing, on February 3, 2012, the convening officer referred all twenty-two charges to a general court-martial. 45 
B. Subsequent Hearings and Strategies
After the Article 32 hearing, Coombs did not rely heavily on Manning's gender identity and emotional health, and instead shifted tactics entirely. After steadily chipping away at the prosecutors' case for months, 46 Coombs and Manning unveiled a proper whistleblower defense on February 27, 2013, when Manning read a statement admitting she leaked the cables and voluntarily pleading guilty to lesser included offenses related to her actions. 47 By taking "full responsibility" for providing the materials to WikiLeaks, Manning confirmed that she knew what she was doing when she leaked 44 Id. at 144-47. 45 Bradley Manning: US General Orders Court Martial for WikiLeaks Suspect, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/bradley-manningcourt-martial-wikileaks. The general court-martial is reserved for the most serious offenses and is the only type at which charges carrying death may be heard. See Pollack, supra note 6, at 5. 46 For more information about other defense strategies employed since the Article 32 hearing, many of which do not rely on speculations or assumptions about Manning's gender identity, see generally THE LAW OFFICES OF 
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the materials and that she did so for moral and political purposes, as a whistleblower.
48
Although the whistleblower defense became the official strategy, the early use of Manning's gender identity as a defense strategy to mitigate Manning's culpability raised eyebrows and prompted much criticism and this criticism remains relevant in an ethical analysis of the strategy. What was said and done cannot be unsaid or undone, and the public (and potentially judicial) response to the early strategy serves as a lesson to those of us committed to both social justice and individual defense.
Upon examination, the strategy appears to have been employed in the context of a hearing in which nearly all the defense requests for discovery were denied, including those for exculpatory evidence. 49 Additionally, the defense had requested forty-seven witnesses 50 but was allowed only two, while the prosecution was allowed to call twenty-one witnesses. 51 Through this lens, the tactic may have been born more of desperation than intentional strategy. Coombs made an early choice between two defense theories, neither of which was ideal. First, there was a story about an isolated, emotionally unstable, young trans person who attempted to go through the chain of command and get help from supervisors but was ignored. In this story, the prosecutor could not establish the "intent" required by the Aiding the Enemy statute because Manning suffered from a psychiatric disorder and thus had diminished capacity and was not responsible for her actions. The second story is that of a freedom-fighting whistleblower who saw war crimes being committed by the military in the midst of an unjust war and was compelled to expose them. Here, Manning was cognizant of her actions, but was justified in so acting because of the immorality of the war in Iraq and the military industrial complex. As it turns out, Manning's experience was an amalgamation of the 48 Before Manning's gender and sexuality were raised by Coombs, they were raised in the court of public opinion-the media. The New York Times ran an article soon after Manning's arrest which traced her childhood from rural Oklahoma, to rural Wales, where classmates made fun of her "for being gay," to the Army, where she was forced to conceal her sexuality. The emotional problems of loneliness and alienation Manning confronted are hardly atypical for a perceptive 20-year-old, particularly one with a long-estranged father dealing with issues of sexual orientation and gender identity who, after being raised in a tiny evangelical community in Oklahoma, finds himself deployed to Baghdad as part of the U.S. Army's brutal war in Iraq . . . . The notion that these reactions to wholly unjustified, massive blood-spilling is psychologically warped is itself warped. 
63
While TAVA and LCR clearly felt Manning's actions were morally wrong and that Coombs's strategic use of Manning's gender and sexuality tarnished the image of LGBT people seeking acceptance in the military, others opposed the defense because it relied on GID as a psychiatric disorder, linking it to the seemingly insulting concept of "diminished capacity."
B. Gender Identity-Disorder?
Before analyzing the DSM diagnosis of GID, it is important to define key terminology and distinguish concepts.
64
"Gender identity" refers to each person's subjective understanding of themselves as being men, women, a combination of those, or neither, and can change and evolve over time. Gender identity is distinct from a person's biological sex, which also exists on a continuum from male to female.
65
"Transgender" is an umbrella term that can be used to describe a person "whose gender identity and/or expression . . . does not or is perceived to not match stereotypical gender norms gays and national security-they'll get beat up or blackmailed and reveal our secrets."). "Sexual orientation" is entirely distinct, referring to whom a person is attracted. A deviation from the "norm" within each of these categories may result in a person being diagnosed with a mental disorder listed in the DSM.
67
"Homosexuality" as a psychiatric diagnosis was not removed from the DSM until 1973. 68 However, the first edition that did not include homosexuality (DSM-III) introduced GID in children as a diagnosis, making it clear that gender conformity was of more concern than a person's sexual activity.
69
The GID diagnosis has been contested by medical professionals 70 and rejected by some trans and queer advocates because it enforces an artificial norm of gender appropriateness and heteronormativity. 69 Ellen K. Feder, Power/Knowledge, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 55, 64 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011). In the previous iteration of the DSM, GID was diagnosed if a person met four criteria: 1) "A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex)"; 2) "[p]ersistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex"; 3) "[t]he disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition"; and 4) "[t]he disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning." DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL IV-TR, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file155_30369.pdf. Section 302.6 Gender Identity Disorder in Children. Section 302.85 Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents or Adults. GID was removed from the DSM-5 in 2013. 70 Lev, supra note 67, at 36-37. 71 Dean Spade, Law as Tactics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 40, 48 (2012) ("The diagnostic criteria of Gender Identity Disorder produces a fiction of a naturalized, untroubled binary gender identity for non-trans people, including a gender-appropriate childhood filled with gender-appropriate toys, role plays and friends. The existence of the criteria, we have also asserted, establishes a mechanism of surveillance by creating a category of deviance that gender non-normative behavior can trigger, which has often particularly led to involuntary psychiatric treatment in young people."). See also Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 275 (Paisley Currah et al., eds. 2006) (noting that GID serves to "pathologize as a mental disorder what ought to be understood instead as one among many human possibilities of determining one's gender for oneself"). Then, in December 2012, the APA Board of Trustees approved major changes to the DSM, which included the removal of the diagnosis "Gender Identity Disorder" from DSM-5, which was published in May 2013.
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78
A new diagnosis has been put in its 72 Spade, supra note 71, at 48. Spade makes clear that the fallacy that medical providers are greater experts on people's gender than those people themselves results "in the enforcement of rigid gender norms on trans bodies with doctors often requiring performances of hyper masculinity and femininity read through straight, white, upper class norms. Those who fail to meet the arbitrary, subjective criteria of their medical providers are frequently denied access to care. . .
. [T]hese criteria and relationships of authority
[are] technologies of the production of gender normativity in which trans bodies experience intensified surveillance and correction." Id. at 49. 73 See Feder, supra note 69, at 62 ("Normalization, the institutionalization of the norm, of what counts as normal, indicates the pervasive standards that structure and define social meaning." There has been a shift from "a focus on health understood as qualities specific to an individual, to normality, a standard imposed from without."). 74 Ford, supra note 10. 75 Butler, supra note 71, at 280 ("[W]e have to ask whether submitting to the diagnosis does not involve, more or less consciously, a certain subjection to the diagnosis such that one does end up internalizing some aspect of the diagnosis, conceiving of oneself as mentally ill or 'failing' in normality, or both."). 76 
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place, however: "Gender Dysphoria" refers to a temporary state of acute emotional distress people may experience about their gender identity, resulting in "a marked incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender," 79 as opposed to GID's overarching pathological disordering. 80 While many called this a step forward for the trans community, others call attention to the crucial other side of the debate, which is that a diagnosis of GID provides needed medical legitimacy for trans individuals who seek necessary gender-affirming medical treatment such as hormone therapy and surgery, as well as individuals who find themselves caught up in institutional settings which categorize people based on sex and gender, such as prisons, treatment facilities, and shelters.
81
A diagnosis of GID is necessary to receive any hormone therapy or surgical procedures under the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, 82 and is the strongest line of defense for trans people who are incarcerated-most often transgender women of color-to demand access to necessary medical treatment in the face of a prison system that so often denies necessary care to those who are locked up. 83 Queer theorist Judith Butler argues that, unless an alternative means of accessing necessary health care for low-income trans people is put in place, GID must be used strategically to pursue such treatment. edical control over trans bodies and lives will always be most dangerous and violent for our community members in prison, jail, detention, homeless shelters and psychiatric hospitals and institutions. The removal of GID or its changing construction might help to further distance some (most likely white, wealthy, male-identified) trans people from external control over their access to affirming care, while simultaneously subjecting other trans people (low-income, incarcerated, people of color, female-identified) to enhanced control."). 84 
atric Association Salutes the T in LGBT,
C. Trans in the Military
Coombs' decision to rely on Manning's transgender identity, in a military setting infamous for being one of the most trans-and homophobic institutions in the U.S., 85 was troubling. The repeal of DADT had no effect on trans people in the military, who must remain officially in the closet to either enlist or avoid discharge, 86 and who suffer abuse and harassment from others enlisted regardless of whether they have expressly come out or not. Discrimination has been described as disparate, with "masculinity in women [being] more acceptable than expressed femininity in men." 87 Discharge for "sexual gender and identity disorders" is considered administrative, not medical, and therefore people who are discharged on these grounds may not access gender-affirming medical treatment through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
88
The military, even more than the psychiatric establishment, strictly enforces gender norms through dress and grooming policies.
89
A deviation from what the military considers "gender appropriate" clothing can result in a person being charged with "crossdressing" and being subjected to discipline or criminal prosecution. 90 from that standpoint centering the most vulnerable in our communities rather than looking to those systems to reflect our identities back to us in ways that is most affirming."); Spade, supra note 71, at 51 n.32 (suggesting treatment of "gender confirming health care for trans people" more like pregnancy, "something that happens to some bodies and requires care but is not an illness or pathology. . . . [T]rans identity need not be considered 'disordered' in order for health services to be considered necessary."). 85 The military has openly discriminated based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation through limits on who can join the military and the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy. See Klasfeld, supra note 62; Klasfeld, supra note 1. 86 See FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 2, at 29. Enlisting in the military requires undergoing a physical examination, and a person can be disqualified for any surgeries deemed to create "major abnormalities and defects of the genitalia. Viewing Manning's case through the lens of trans advocacy and the critiques of GID, it is important to consider next the system of punishment Manning faces and the role Coombs plays as defense counsel. While Manning is not being tried in the Article III criminal system, the military criminal system is analogous in important ways.
91
The next section will explore the complex role of defense counsel, the rights of people accused of crimes vis-à-vis their attorneys, and how the two coalesce in the development of defense strategies.
III. THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM AND THE COMPLICATED ROLE
OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY The conundrum of how to serve both the individual client and the larger community is one that has troubled social justice lawyers and led to movements in radical and community lawyering in the civil context.
92
The challenge comes to an ethical head in the realm of criminal defense work. Different schools of thought have emerged to grapple with the question of what a criminal defense attorney should do when the interests of her client conflict with or cause harm to the interests of others, particularly marginalized and oppressed communities. As one leading theorist has phrased the issue, must a defense attorney "refrain from zealous advocacy, or even subvert their clients' cases, whenever the social good of doing so outweighs the moral costs"? 93 This section will first examine justifications for punishment, which are helpful to frame an analysis about effective defense tactics. Next, it will review the role of the defense attorney and the rights of people accused of crimes vis-à-vis their attorneys, highlighting conflicts that can emerge when developing a defense strategy, and the rules that govern-to an extent-when counsel and client disagree. Finally, this section will examine two schools of thought that grapple with such conflicts: those who believe in zeal- 91 Procedural safeguards shared by Article III courts and general courts-martial include, among others, the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent, and-most relevantly for this note-the right to effective assistance of counsel (discussed in more detail below in Section III.B). MASON, supra note 25, at 9-10. See also ELSEA, supra note 17. 92 ous advocacy at all costs on behalf of individual clients, and those who believe that dignity-based, anti-humiliation, anti-subordination principles should guide individual representation in a way that is ultimately and primarily accountable to the larger community. Each perspective will be discussed in turn.
A. Why Do We Punish?
Two recognized theoretical justifications for punishment in American criminal law are utilitarianism and retributivism. Utilitarian theory views punishment as a harm to be avoided, focusing on deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 94 to maximize social good and minimize future crime. Retributivism, by contrast, is a backwards-looking theory focused on morality-based punishment: wrongdoers should be punished because they deserve it-they get their "just deserts"-not because it will result in fewer crimes. 95 In both contexts, the question remains: should a person be punished for involuntary acts? For retributivists, punishment is only deserved if the wrongdoer chose to violate a rule of society-involuntary actions are not subject to the same eagerness to punish. On the other hand, utilitarianism "can [be used to] justify the punishment of a person known to be innocent of wrongdoing." 96 Michel Foucault theorized that a main justification for punishment and imprisonment was to create "docile bodies . . . bodies that were both efficient in performance and obedient to author- 94 Proponents of utilitarianism view punishment as the means to achieve the goal of general deterrence (punishing one person deters others from committing similar acts) as well as specific deterrence by incapacitation (being locked up and prevented from misconduct), intimidation (people are afraid of incarceration and conform their behavior to the law to avoid punishment), and rehabilitating the defendant to help him to reform his actions. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14-15 (5th ed. 2009).
95 Three main subsets of retributivism are theoretically prominent. The first is revenge-based, whereby the victim uses the state to take out his anger and hatred of the wrongdoer. The second subset views punishment as a way of achieving "social balance" in a society where one of its members has breached the social contract by choosing not to be burdened with rules that otherwise benefit everyone. The third subset sees punishment as a means to right a wrong-getting even by making the victim whole through the punishment of the perpetrator. 
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ity."
97
Prisons discipline the bodies of those locked up within them by manipulating, classifying, examining, and constantly surveilling them; this discipline "make[s] them more useful for mass production and at the same time easier to control." 98 According to Foucault, normalization is also a goal of punishment, as prisons were ostensibly designed to "inscribe the norms of the society in the bodies of criminals by subjecting them to reconstructed patterns of behaviour." 99 The military's punishment system recognizes discipline explicitly as a modus operandi: "it might be said that discipline is as important as liberty interests." 100 
B. The Rights of People Accused of Crimes and the Role of Defense Counsel
Once involved in the criminal or military punishment system, a person facing jail or prison time arguably needs the assistance of counsel to navigate those intentionally complex legal systems; in this light, the role of the defense attorney is to keep her clients from being locked inside a cage in jail or prison for any amount of time.
101
How forcefully a defense attorney should counsel her client with regards to a particular defense strategy to that end is debatable. Crucially, the role of defense counsel is to advocate for her client regardless of whether the person is guilty or innocent.
People accused of crimes have a right to effective assistance of counsel, both in military and state criminal courts. 99 Id. at 89. 100 MASON, supra note 25, at 2. 101 With regards to representing transgender people who face incarceration, it must be noted that "verbal harassment, physical abuse, and sexual assault and coercion create an exceptionally dangerous climate for transgender, gender non-conforming, and intersex people in prison," particularly for transgender people of color who are most likely to be locked up. THE SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, IT'S WAR IN HERE 26 (2007) , available at http://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf. 102 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (finding that to establish that their attorney was ineffective, the person represented must show that 1) the attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and 2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"). See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); ELSEA, supra note 17 (noting that in the military court context, a defendant's appointed counsel must be "certified as qualified and may not be someone who has taken any part in the investigation or prosecution, unless explicitly requested by the defendant" (citing 10 U.S.C. § 827)). [Vol. 16:319 forms during trial, but one area that has been studied, debated, and affected by recent Supreme Court decisions, is the extension of the duty of effective assistance to pre-trial counseling with respect to whether to go to trial or take a plea.
103
When counseling a client about whether or not to take a plea, defense counsel may utilize varying degrees of persuasion-from remaining neutral and making suggestions to advising and even urging.
104
Neutrality comports with a client-centered model of defense lawyering, but the Second Circuit found that such a "hands-off" approach did not rise to the level of effective assistance. 105 Another key concern with regards to deciding the appropriate level of persuasion is "[t]he danger[ ] of paternalism, and the attorney's subordination of her client," to the attorney's own ideas of what is best for her client.
106
The ethical rules themselves are mere guideposts-the answer to the debate comes down to personal ethics.
107
While the person accused has the "ultimate authority" to make all fundamental decisions such as whether or not to plead guilty, testify, or waive a jury trial, 108 the Comments to Model Rule 1.2 suggest that defense counsel is charged with making tactical or strategic decisions. Crucially, however, "concern for third persons who might be adversely affected" is assigned to the client. The philosophy of zealous representation was famously articulated by Lord Brougham in 1821:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
118
Abbe Smith, a prominent legal scholar and former public defender who has written extensively on the topic, agrees that zealous advocacy is an imperative, especially for public defenders. 119 Smith explicitly defends the use of stereotypes to paint a certain picture of the defendant or complaining witness or to poke holes in the government's theory, if this will advance her clients' interests: "[d]efense lawyers cannot afford to be color-blind, gender-blind, or even slightly near-sighted when it comes to race, gender, sexual orientation, and ethnicity, because jurors will be paying close attention and they have come to the trial with their own feelings about these issues." dversarial zeal is most important when the stakes are high, the adversary powerful, and the level of trust between the lawyer and client low. The only way to compensate for the disadvantage in resources and power is to allow a more fiercely adversarial ethic on behalf of intimidated and isolated clients who lack the means to hire their own attorneys. Only through zealous advocacy can there be meaningful access to justice."). Importantly, while Smith premises her ethics on the fact that zealous advocacy is imperative in an adversarial system, many dispute that the criminal system is in fact adversarial. cross-examining a transgender woman complaining witness, and endorsed pointing out her birth-assigned sex (male) despite the fact that she explicitly identified as a woman, where defense counsel represented a cisgender male accused of assaulting her.
121
Persuasion, she claims, is the defender's main tool, and persuasion often involves "playing on the sympathies and prejudices of an audience . . . you get them to identify with the position you're advancing, or at least identify less with your opponent's position."
122
Another supporter of this view states that zealous advocacy is a moral responsibility, making it necessary for the defense attorney to "separate her individual beliefs and morals from those of her client. . . . The means used and the end attained are not reflective of the lawyer's principles."
123
In an interesting career twist, however, Smith was contacted to represent crime victim Claudia Brenner, after she and her partner were shot at in the woods-Brenner was wounded and her partner was killed.
124
The defendant used the gay panic defense, claiming that after watching the women have sex in the woods he was provoked into shooting them because he had suffered abuse as a child, had been sexually assaulted by men in prison, experienced frequent rejection by women, and because his mother was a lesbian. 125 While maintaining that she did not find fault with the defense attorney's ethical choices, Smith admitted to feeling good about being on the "right side" in that case.
126
She cites another case in which she represented a person who was abused by police and falsely accused of assault once it was discovered the person was trans: "Representing this client was entirely consistent with much of what motivates me to be a criminal defender: I was defending a kind of cultural defense, if the facts allow. I'm likely to suggest that my client's intent was seduction, not rape, and that his ungentlemanly method was the product of machismo and bravado, not a criminal state of mind. . . . Perhaps I am exploiting cultural stereotypes, as opposed to raising a formal cultural defense, but I'm not sure the two are so different. The cultural defenses raised on behalf of newly arrived immigrants and accused rapists sound alike: my client did not intend to commit a crime; he thought he was doing what was expected of him in his cultural milieu; my client didn't do it, the male culture did."). 147, 210 (2000) . 124 Smith, supra note 121, at 111. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 112-13.
marginalized member of a social minority (who also happened to be poor and black) who was a victim of ill treatment at the hands of the police." 127 She then claims that criminal defense attorneys should follow trends of social justice, not set them, exploiting stereotypes as long as they exist:
[A]s our society becomes more enlightened and accepting, so will criminal practice. There are some who believe that lawyers-and especially criminal trial lawyers, who are sometimes in the public light-ought to lead the way to this new day. I do not think so. I think we ask enough already of those who defend the least popular and least powerful among us. 128 David Luban, a critic of the absolute imperative of zealous representation, has theorized about a model of legal advocacy which centralizes human dignity and the interactions between attorneys and those they serve, not merely a series of judicial adjudications. 129 He claims that the professional ideal of "moral activism . . . imposes on lawyers the moral responsibility to 'break role' in compelling moral circumstances to respond to the human pathos of those on whom harm would be visited as a result of adhering to professional role obligations." 130 He has admitted, however, that his theory applies most strongly to civil legal advocacy, where the parties to the dispute are arguably more equal in terms of power and control; criminal defenders are different-those accused of crimes, particularly low-income people assigned public defenders, face the power of the state with their liberty at stake. 131 Another scholar finds that, while considerations of negative stereotypes and detrimental community effect should be talked about between the attorney and client, the ultimate decision of whether or not to utilize such stereotypes as part of an advantageous criminal defense are ultimately up to the client; the lawyer's feelings about it should not preclude such a defense. 132 The zealous advocacy approach has been criticized for its disregard for the "truth" and its willingness to rely on potentially neg-
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133
It is true that defense attorneys put forth to the judge or jury their client's side of a story-in gay and trans panic cases, defense attorneys are merely relating the very real prejudice their client experienced, and which they claim led to their actions. It is certainly not the attorney's fault if the person accused suffered from bias. However, as Smith alluded, a savvy defender will not rely on a prejudicial stereotype which is not commonly held. The issue is whether the defense attorney must wait for negative stereotypes to fall out of favor before ceasing to exploit them in the courtroom.
ii. Dignitary and Anti-humiliation Postures-Ivory Tower Luxury?
Scholar Anthony Alfieri takes issue with the use of narratives, constructed either by defense attorney or client, that uphold dominant beliefs and assumptions which perpetuate racist stereotypes in cases involving crimes of violence committed by people of color against whites. 134 The fact that such narratives, which play on the prejudices of the audience and damaging stereotypes, are very persuasive (and thus effective for the defendants who use them) is the main reason not to employ them. Critical race theorist Richard Delgado stated that Alfieri's critical "attention to the narrative side of lawyering can enable lawyers representing the poor and disenfranchised to achieve a better brand of justice." 135 Alfieri agrees with Luban's model as applied to preserving the human dignity of criminal defendants of color and their communities, but rejects the idea that criminal defense is different. 136 Smith openly criticized Alfieri for suggesting that defense attorneys should sacrifice their clients' liberty for the good of the broader community.
137
To follow Alfieri's reasoning would be to "completely transform criminal defense lawyers from defenders of 133 Alfieri writes primarily about high-profile interracial violence cases in which African-American men are charged with some form of violent assault against a white person. Smith recognized that high-profile cases involving media coverage may indeed mean the defense attorney should abandon strategies she might otherwise employ if such strategies would hurt the defendant's community. 141 Ahmad, by contrast, does not distinguish between high-profile and "smaller" cases in his assertion that negative stereotypes should not be used in defense tactics:
[A]s individual, as particularized, and as client-centered as a representation may be, it does not occur in a vacuum . . . just as the [defenders'] efforts in an individual representation will not eradicate racism, sexism, or homophobia, nor will a client's individual case, by itself, resolve the systemic oppression of poor people by the criminal justice system. Both efforts depend upon our aggregate efforts, and rely upon the notion that our individual actions, no matter how small, are of consequence. They matter. They are subject to moral scrutiny. Even in the smallest of cases, we are as lawyers creatures in an ecosystem that shifts and responds as we do. Assume that use of the term "Muslim fundamentalist" will find favor with the judge and that it will be to the client's advantage. . . . It is, in my mind, not a stretch at all to think that an immigration judge's subscription to the broad application of the term "Muslim fundamentalist" might affect her judgment on whether to permit [another Arab or Muslim] immigrant's detention. We must be honest in our recognition of the lawyer's role and responsibility in shaping this judge's judgment, and how it might affect others in the future.
The lawyer-client relationship may be a confidential one, but it is not wholly a private one. We can learn from queer theory the value of transparency, of understanding that the acts of individuals are of consequence to the collective. Another defense clinic professor agreed with this approach, and wrote about her experience supervising student-attorneys who spoke with their clients about the negative biases that would likely be fueled by defenses they had contemplated, which led the clients to ultimately choose "a fair fight with family members [complaining witnesses] for whom they held complex feelings." 144 The next section will compare controversial defense strategies that rely on characteristics of the accused and appeal to bias in an attempt to mitigate culpability or obtain a reduced sentence. It will analyze both the justifications and the criticism of these strategies in an attempt to decipher the wisdom of Coombs' GID defense.
IV. DON'T CRIMINALIZE-PATHOLOGIZE!
The following controversial storytelling tactics-insanity, battered women's syndrome, rotten social background, and cultural defenses-are used by defenders to present mitigating evidence of personal or cultural characteristics of people accused to show they did not have the mental culpability required by the offense charged. 145 These theories have been criticized as exploitative and reductionist, as racist, anti-feminist, and homophobic. Alternately, they are criticized for letting people off the hook who don't truly "deserve" it-the genre has been referred to disparagingly as "abuse excuse."
146
Those who defend these strategies argue that they can humanize defendants and educate judges and juries about the tragedies that occur at the intersections of crime, culture, race, poverty, gender, and mental illness. More importantly, they can produce positive results for people accused of crimes by keeping individual client and commitment to anti-subordination? Of course there is. But our fidelity to ourselves as lawyers depends upon the honest embrace of such tension as a threshold step to its resolution. Id. at 126-27. 143 Id. at 125. See also Nilsen, supra note 110, at 23 n.92. 144 Nilsen, supra note 110, at 23 n.92. 145 These tactics are not directly related to Manning's case because they deal with racism and communities of color; however, they analogously address the use of negative stereotypes as a criminal defense. 146 
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them from being locked up, overturning convictions, or reducing time spent incarcerated. Crucially, they are employed in the face of much more abusive tactics by judges and prosecutors, whose discriminatory attitudes fuel the majority of the racist, classist, and homophobic discourse and behavior in criminal courtrooms. It is important to note that the defenses are not frequently used, and when used they are not often successful-they are often a gamble taken as a last resort.
A. Insanity Defense-Psychological Evidence
The longest-standing, and perhaps most infamous, of the narrative defense strategies is the insanity defense. Insanity is a legal term of art, and is not synonymous with mental illness as defined by the APA or the DSM. 147 The test for insanity is notoriously difficult to conform to 148 and is also highly politicized, having undergone scathing criticism. 149 When used successfully, the defense may result in acquittal by reason of insanity, a reduced sentence in capital cases, or the accused being declared incompetent to stand trial altogether. 150 The analogous defense in the military context is lack of mental responsibility. 151 Coombs leaned heavily towards this defense at the Article 32 hearing by focusing on the mental instability he associated with Manning's gender identity. GID symptoms could never approach the level of psychological incapacity required for an insanity defense, but Coombs did not attempt to take the strategy that far. Instead he presented a series of inferences: Manning had GID; therefore, she suffered from emotional distress which is severe enough to be listed as a psychiatric disorder in the DSM; it followed that she had a diminished capacity to either rec-
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trial took place. 185 While evidence about Ms. Nelson's gender identity was cited as contributing to commuting her sentence, it can easily be argued that the New Jersey Supreme Court's reluctance to kill Leslie Ann Nelson had less to do with its concern for a transgender woman with a history of abuse, trauma, and depression, and more with its growing inclination to abolish the death penalty entirely.
B. The "Bad"-The "Deviant" Archetype
A much more significant number of cases suggest that being openly or visibly gay, queer, or transgender in criminal court makes it more likely that a person will receive a harsher sentence. One example is the case of Calvin Burdine, a white gay man convicted of capital murder in a trial that lasted less than thirteen hours. 186 The most notorious aspect of the case was the homophobia Burdine suffered at the hands of every institutional actor in the courtroom, including his defense attorney who failed to object to multiple homophobic comments by the prosecutor, the most of egregious of which was in his closing statement to the jury: "[s]ending a homosexual to the penitentiary certainly isn't a very bad punishment for a homosexual, and that's what he's asking you to do."
In some ways, then, Manning was in a better position for Coombs to have used a controversial defense that, if Manning were a person of color or visibly gender-nonconforming, would likely not have been effective. As a young, white, apparently gender-conforming person in a military uniform, the prosecution (a team of white JAG attorneys, with the lead prosecutor being a white man) and the judge (a white woman) could look at her and relate in some ways. However, Coombs' use of a GID-diminished capacity defense in a military environment, known for enforcing homogeneity through regulations and violence, and for being institutionally transphobic, made the strategy look less than wise.
CONCLUSION
The ethical issues surrounding the use of negative stereotypical narratives as strategic mitigating factors in criminal defense cases remain complex and disputed. In Pfc. Chelsea Manning's case, Coombs called attention to Manning's emotional distress and attributed it to her gender identity, even though that was likely only one aspect of the distress. As there is no whistleblower disorder, GID was a diagnosable cause for Manning's emotional disturbance. And Coombs used that argument despite perhaps having never talked to another transgender person in his life. However, a savvy defense attorney will always consider the mental health of those she represents. If a person is mentally ill, a defense attorney will likely call attention to that mental illness to show that the person accused was not acting voluntarily, or lacked the requisite intent. Here, the "mental illness" at issue was a highly contested diagnosis that pathologized an oppressed group of people.
The crux of Coombs's early argument for using GID as a mitigating factor appears to be a commitment to zealous representa-
